Household specialization and the labor-supply elasticities of women and men by Bredemeier, Christian
SFB 
823 
Household specialization and 
the labor-supply elasticities 
of women and men 
D
iscussion P
aper 
 
Christian Bredemeier 
 
 
 
Nr. 17/2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household Specialization
and the Labor-Supply Elasticities
of Women and Men
Christian Bredemeier
TU Dortmund University
Abstract
This paper studies gender di¤erences in the elasticity of labor supply in a model of
household specialization. We show that household specialization implies larger Frisch
elasticities for the partner that specializes in home production. Quantitatively, em-
pirical time-use ratios alone imply di¤erences in the Frisch elasticity between women
and men of about 50%. Similar results are obtained for long-run elasticities. However,
limited commitment within the household reduces the gender di¤erences in long-run
labor-supply elasticities. Our results imply that the elasticity of labor supply is not
a deep parameter but can react on, e.g., gender-biased employment subsidies, public
child care provision, and divorce laws.
Keywords: Labor-supply elasticity, gender, home production
JEL classication: J22, J16, D13
1 Introduction
The elasticity of labor supply is a key concept in many parts of economics including, next
to labor economics, macroeconomics and optimal taxation theory. There is empirical
consensus that labor supply is not equally elastic across the population (e.g., Francesconi
2002 and Keane 2011). Di¤erences in labor-supply elasiticities have implications for the
behavior of di¤erent population groups over the business cycle, for the e¤ectiveness of
employment subsidies, and for the distribution of optimal marginal tax rates.
This paper focusses on gender di¤erences in labor-supply elasticities. There is strong
empirical evidence that womens labor supply is in general more elastic than mens (Cogan
1981; Eckstein and Wolpin 1989; Bourguignon and Magnac 1990; van der Klaauw 1996;
Francesconi 2002; Dechter 2013). Concerning the Frisch elasticity which governs short-
run reactions to wage changes, empirical estimates are about twice as high for women
than for men (Keane 2011).
Christian.Bredemeier@tu-dortmund.de. Financial support from SFB 823, project A4, is gratefully
acknowledged.
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In a simple decision problem with continuous labor supply and without home pro-
duction, the Frisch elasticity equals the inverse of the curvature of labor disutility. One
may thus explain gender di¤erences in the Frisch elasticity by gender di¤erences in this
parameter. Alternatively, one can relate the higher labor-supply elasticities of women
at the macro level to the higher importance of the extensive margin for this group. In
a heterogeneous-agents model with discrete labor supply, the labor-supply elasticity de-
pends on the distribution of reservation wages rather than on the steepness of labor
disutility (Chang and Kim 2006).
This paper gives an explanation for gender di¤erences in the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply in a model of household specialization. In the model, the partner that specializes in
home production (traditionally, the wife) is predicted to have the higher Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. This result does not rely on di¤erences in preferences but is a result of
specialization which also holds if men and women have identical preferences.
Generally, it is well known that home production increases the elasticity of labor supply
as home produced goods are likely to be substitutes to market-purchased consumption
goods (e.g., Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004 and Rogerson and Wallenius 2009). However,
this argument applies symmetrically for both, women and men. Gender di¤erences in
the Frisch elasticity in our analysis are caused by di¤erent allocations of working time
to home production and market work. In a model with home production, the Frisch
elasticity of market labor supply is approximately equal to the elasticity of total work
multiplied by the ratio of total to market work. The exact Frisch elasticity also contains
the e¤ects of substitution within home production and between home production and
market consumption but these e¤ects are likely rather small quantitatively.
Using this result, we can explain about half of the gender di¤erences in empirical Frisch
elasticities using time use evidence on household specialization (Ramey and Francis 2009).
As, empirically, the ratio of total to market work is about 50% higher for women than
for men, the model implied Frisch elasticities are - with equal preferences - roughly 50%
bigger for women.
Our analysis further implies that labor-supply elasticity estimates are biased when
home production is omitted from the estimated model. We demonstrate this by estimating
a standard model with an artical data set generated in a model with home production.
There, we estimate pronounced gender di¤erences in work preferences although the data-
generating model features idential preferences. We also estimate two model versions (with
and without home production) with real world data on gender-specic labor supply and
earnings. There, we estimate very similar preferences for both genders in the model with
home production. By contrast, when estimating the model without home production with
the same data, results strongly reject the hypothesis of equal preferences.
We also analyze the implications of our model for long-run elasticities. As is known,
home production can imply substantial long-run labor-supply elasticities even under bal-
anced growth (e.g., Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan 2003). Considering gender di¤er-
ences, we nd that also long-run labor-supply elasticities tend to be higher for partners
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that specialize in home production. This has important policy implications as policy
makers can expect rather strong e¤ects of policies which change long-run earnings poten-
tials of population groups that initially work much in home production. But, our model
also implies that the labor-supply elasticity is not a deep parameter and is thus generally
policy-variant. E.g., public provision or subsidizing of child care which reduce the amount
of motherswork at home can reduce the e¤ectiveness of employment subsidies for women.
We further show that long-run labor-supply elasticities also depend on the degree of
commitment between spouses. If permanent wage changes cause changes in bargaining
positions and re-negotiations in the household, gender di¤erences in the elasticity of la-
bor supply are reduced. Consider, e.g., a relative wage rise for the wife which has two
counteracting e¤ects on her market hours. First, the household substitutes away from
using the now more expensive time of the wife in home production. But, second, the
household also puts a higher weight on leisure of the wife who has now more inuence in
household decision making due to improved outside options. The less spouses (can) com-
mit to initial arrangements with their partners (e.g., because of loose divorce regulations,
see Voena 2013), the stronger is this second e¤ect and the lower and more equal are
the labor-supply elasticities of both genders. Also this implies that the elasticity of labor
supply is generally policy variant. The e¤ectiveness of activating employment subsidies
or optimal tax rates depend among other things also on divorce legislation.
This paper contributes to the literature on the non-preference determinants of labor-
supply elasticities. Imai and Keane (2004) show that estimates of the Frisch elasticity are
downward-biased when the estimated model omits the e¤ects of on-the-job human capital
accumulation. Similarly, Domeij and Floden (2006) demonstrate the importance of bor-
rowing constraints for the Frisch elasticity. Most strongly related to our paper, Rogerson
and Wallenius (2009) point to the relevance of home production for retiring decisions
but do not consider gender di¤erences. Concerning gender di¤erences in the labor-supply
elasticity, Ortigueira and Siassi (2013) stress the role of female labor supply as an insur-
ance device. Our explanation is complementary to theirs as it works also under complete
capital markets. However, when it comes to long-run wage changes, our explanation has
substantially di¤erent implications than the argument of Ortigueira and Siassi (2013).
In a model of household risk sharing with limited commitment, there is no transfer in
the steady state. We demonstrate that this implies that spouseslong-run labor-supply
elasticities in a model without home production equal the ones in a standard bachelor
model with complete capital markets. Compatible with our predictions, the micro esti-
mations of Kaya (2014) show that female labor-supply elasticities are particularly high
for couples with young children (where home production is arguably important) and in
situations where the degree of assortative mating is high (which increases the importance
of household specialization, see Bredemeier and Juessen 2013).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
set-up. Section 3 analyzes Frisch labor-supply elasticities. Section 4 studies long-run
labor-supply elasticities. Section 5 concludes.
3
2 Model
A household consists of two spouses, a wife F and a husband M , who live forever. There
are two commodities c and d. c is a usual consumption good which is produced and
purchased on the market while d is a Beckerian home commoditiy that the household
produces itself. Spouses face a joint budget constraint and engage jointly in home pro-
duction. Each household chooses consumption quantities of the two commodities, hours
worked n, and home production times h for both members.
The households decision problem is to maximize the Lagrangean
L = Et
1X
s=0
s
26666664
P
g=M;F g;t+s  u

c1 g;t+s
1  + d
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
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M;t+s   dt+s
i
37777775 , (1)
where w are wage rates, k is physical capital, r the rental rate on it, and  summarizes
dividends, taxes, transfers, and other lump-sum incomes or expenditures. A denotes
TFP in home production, , d, , l, g, and  are parameters, and  and  Lagrange
multipliers. Note that we generally allow for gender di¤erences in labor disutility.
Importantly, the g;t+s are utility weights which sum up to one. The rst line in
the square brackets in equation (1) describes the Pareto frontier, we are thus considering
cooperative household decision making. However, we assume that couples are acting under
limited commitment (as proposed by Ligon 2002). Spouses cannot commit themselves
perfectly to an initial joint plan such that the utility weights can react to permanent
changes in, e.g., relative wages of the spouses. By constrast, spouses are assumed to be
able to commit themselves to an e¢ cient sharing of the risk associated with transitory
shocks. This implies that the utility weights do not react to short-run wage uctuations.
We consider three variants of the model, one without home production and two vari-
ants that include home production. In themodel version without home production (variant
1), we set the valuation of the home-produced good in the utility function to zero, d = 0.
In the rst model variant with home production, we assume that home production vari-
ables, hM;t, hF;t, and dt have to be determined one period in advance. In this model
variant with pre-determined home production (variant 2), the household problem is to
maxL over fcg;t+s; ng;t+s; hg;t+s+1; dt+s+1; kt+s+1g1s=0 .
This model variant is supposed to be understood as a means of demonstration. It allows
us to disentangle the e¤ect of working in home production per se from substitution within
home production. In the nal model variant, we allow households to choose home produc-
tion simultaneously with market labor supply. In this model variant with simultaneous
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choice (variant 3), the household problem is to
maxL over fcg;t+s; ng;t+s; hg;t+s; dt+s; kt+s+1g1s=0 :
This is the full model which features all e¤ects that arise in reaction to wage changes.
The rst-order conditions for cM;t, cF;t; nM;t; nF;t; hM;t; hF;t; dt; kt+1; t, and t, re-
spectively, are
M;tc
 
M;t= t; (2)
F;tc
 
F;t = t; (3)
M;tll

M;t= twM;t; (4)
F;tll

F;t= twF;t; (5)
EtM;t(+1)ll

M;t(+1)=Ett(+1) (1  )At+shF;t(+1)h M(+1); (6)
EtF;t(+1)ll

F;t(+1)=Ett(+1)At+sh
 1
F;t(+1)h
1 
M(+1); (7)
dd
 
t(+1)=Ett(+1); (8)
t= Ett+1 (1 + rt   ) ; (9)
dt= h

Fh
1 
M ; (10)
cM;t + cF;t + bt+1=wM;tnM;t + wF;tnF;t + (1 + rt) bt +  t; (11)
where lg;t = ng;t + hg;t is total work of spouse g = F;M and the (+1) indicates the
potantial pre-determination of home production. Conditions (6), (7), (8), and (10) are,
of course, irrelevant in the model variant without home production.
3 Frisch elasticities
3.1 Analytical results
How does the couple react to transitory wage changes? Formally, we consider an unantic-
ipated change in bwM;t or bwF;t, respectively. Considering the Frisch labor-supply elasticity,
we hold the valuation of wealth, , constant. Further, there is no commitment problem
associated with transitory wage changes in the short run, thus, the utility weights g;t are
constant. This implies that, to determine the Frisch elasticity, we only need to consider
the rst-order conditions (4) - (8) and (10). In order to calculate the Frisch elasticities,
we consider the following log-linearized versions of these conditions:
M
nM
lM
bnM;t + M hMlM bhM;t= bwM;t;(12)
F
nF
lF
bnF;t + F hFlF bhF;t= bwF;t; (13)
MnM
lM
EtbnM;t(+1) + MhMlM + 
bhM;t(+1)   bhF;t(+1)   Etbt(+1)=0; (14)
(   1)bhM;t(+1) + FnFlF EtbnF;t(+1) +

FhF
lF
+ 1  
bhF;t(+1)   Etbt(+1)=0; (15)
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 bdt(+1)   Etbt(+1)=0; (16)
  (1  )bhM;t   bhF;t + bdt=0, (17)
where a hat "^" indicates percentage deviations from steady state. One of the key drivers
of the results can be seen in the rst two equations above. When agents work some
time in home production, a one-percent increase in market hours, bng;t, increases marginal
labor disutility only by the curvature parameter g multiplied by the ratio of market to
total work. This mechanically follows from the fact that a one-percent increase in market
hours increases total working time by less than one percent. We now go through the three
di¤erent model variants and calculate the Frisch elasticity.
In the model without home production, we can focus on the rst two conditions (12)
and (13) as the other four conditions (14) - (17) relate to home-production variables.
Further, as spouses do not work in home production in this variant, hg;t = 0, market
work is equal to total work, nM=lM = nF =lF = 1. In matrix form, the system can thus
be written as  
M 0
0 F
!

 bnM;tbnF;t
!
=
 
1 0
0 1
!

 bwM;tbwF;t
!
.
It is solved by bnM;tbnF;t
!
=
 
M 0
0 F
! 1

 
1 0
0 1
!

 bwM;tbwF;t
!
=
 
1
M
0
0 1F
!

 bwM;tbwF;t
!
.
Thus, in this model variant, we obtain the well-known standard result that the Frisch
elasticity is constant and reects the utility functions curvature in hours worked,
FLSEg =
1
g
.
As a consequence, gender di¤erences in the Frisch elasticity can only be generated by
gender di¤erences in preferences in this model variant without home production.
In the model variant with predetermined home production, the household can not react
to wage changes with changes in home production on impact. Formally, Et 1bt = 0 in
conditions (14) - (16). It follows that bhM;t = bhF;t = bdt = 0. So, also in this model variant,
we can focus on the rst two conditions (12) and (13) when determining the impact
reactions to wage changes. By contrast to the model variant without home production,
spouses do work positive home hours such that the shares of steady-state working time
devoted to market work, n=l, are below one. This model variant can thus be summarized
as  
M  nMlM 0
0 F  nFlF
!

 bnM;tbnF;t
!
=
 
1 0
0 1
!

 bwM;tbwF;t
!
.
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The solution is bnM;tbnF;t
!
=
 
M  nMlM 0
0 F  nFlF
! 1

 
1 0
0 1
!

 bwM;tbwF;t
!
=
 
1
M
0
0 1F
 lFnF
!

 bwM;tbwF;t
!
:
Here, the Frisch elasticity is not a constant but depends on time use,
FLSEg =
1
g
 lg
ng
: (18)
Specically, the absolute value of the Frisch elasticity decreases in the share of total labor
that is devoted to market work. With household specialization, this translates into higher
Frisch elasticities of the partner that specializes in home production traditionally, the
wife.
In the full model with simultaneous choice, we need to consider all six conditions (12)
- (17). In matrix form, we write them as
0BBBBBBBBB@
M nM
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M hM
lM
0 0 0 0
0 0 F nFlF
F hF
lF
0 0
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0 0 0 0   1
0    1 0   1 0
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
0BBBBBBBBB@
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0BBBBBBBBB@
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0 0
0 0
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1CCCCCCCCCA

 bwM;tbwF;t
!
.
The solution of this model variant is0BBBBBBBBB@
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.
So, the Frisch elasticities in this full model are
FLSEM =
1
M
 lM
nM
+
hM
nM
 (1 + )  1

; (19)
FLSEF =
1
F
 lF
nF
+
hF
nF
    (1 + )

. (20)
Also here, the Frisch elasticties depend on time use. The Frisch elasticities in the full model
contain the term 1g 
lg
ng
which we already know from the variant with predetermined
home production. Here, a second term is added to the Frisch elasticity that describes
substitution within home production (governed by the parameter ) as well as substitution
7
Table 1: Summary of Frisch elasticties in the di¤erent model versions.
Men Women
without home production 1M
1
F
predetermined home prod. 1M 
lM
nM
1
F
 lFnF
simultaneous choice 1M 
lM
nM
1
F
 lFnF
+ hmnM 
( 1++)
 +
hF
nF
  (1+)
into or out of home production (governed by the parameter ).
It is insightful to consider the special case where  ! 1 and  = 1=2 such that we
have log utility from the home good (a prerequisite for balanced growth as we will see
below) and no ex-ante gender productivity di¤erences in home production (specialization
then originates in wage di¤erences). In this special case the second terms in both Frisch
elasticities (19) and (20) simplify to zero. We can thus conclude that the Frisch elasticities
in the full model do not di¤er strongly from their counterparts in the model variant with
predetermined home production when parameters do not di¤er too much from ! 1 and
 = 1=2.
Table 1 summarizes the Frisch labor-supply elasticities in the three model variants.
The main di¤erence between the variant without home production and the two variants
with home production is that in the latter ones, the Frisch elasticities depend on steady-
state time use ratios. Di¤erences between the two model variants with home production
follow from substitution e¤ects within home production and into or out of home produc-
tions. Quantitatively, however, these e¤ects are likely to be rather small.
3.2 Quantitative Evaluation
Relation to time-use evidence. We have worked out that, in a model with home
production, Frisch elasticities depend on the steady-state time-use ratios of women and
men. We now consider which portion of empiricial gender di¤erences in Frisch elasticities
can be explained through observed di¤erences in time use. Table 2 shows the weekly
working times of individuals in prime working age (25-54) in the United States for 2005.
The information stems from Ramey and Francis (2009). We see that di¤erences in total
labor are small, women work some three hours more per week than men. By contrast,
there are pronounced di¤erences between genders with respect to the allocation of total
labor to market work and home production. Men devote about 68% of their labor to
market work while, for women, this number is only about 46%.
Using these empirical numbers in our model-implied Frisch elasticities, we see that they
imply substantial gender di¤erences in the elasticity of labor supply even without gender
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Table 2: Weekly time devoted to work activities of 25-54 years old in 2005, from Ramey
and Francis (2009).
Men Women Gender ratio
total labor l 54.1 57.2 0.95
market work n 36.8 26.1 1.41
home production h 17.3 31.1 0.56
share of market work n=l 0.68 0.46 1.49
di¤erences in preferences. Equation (18) shows that women have Frisch elasticities which
are about 50% higher than those of men in the model variant with predetermined home
production. In the model with simultaneous choices on home production and labor supply,
Frisch elasticities are similar if the calibration does not di¤er to much from log utility in
home production and equal productivities of genders in the home. Many empirical studies
suggest that the female share in opportunity costs is somewhat above 50%. Considering
equations (19) and (20), this implies that the Frisch elasticity is somewhat larger for men
and somewhat smaller for women than in the model with predetermined home production.
Given that empirical estimates of the Frisch labor-supply elasticity are about twice
as high for women than for men (Keane 2011), we see that about half of these gender
di¤erences can be explained solely by the empirical gender di¤erences in the fractions of
working time devoted to home production and market work, respectively.1
Simulation/estimation exercise. In order to further evaluate the quantitative
implications of our model results, we perform a simulation/estimation exercise with the
model variants 1 and 3. We rst simulate the full model with home production and
simultaneous choice. Then, we use the articial data from this simulation to estimate the
model variant that does not include home production.
To parameterize the full model, we use a combination of setting certain parameters and
calibrating others. Most importantly, we set the parameters that determine the curvature
of labor disutility equally to M = F = 1:5. We also set the other two preference
parameters and use the values  =  = 1 which imply balanced growth, see Section 4
below. We set the time preference rate to  = 0:995 implying an annual interest rate
of 2% as we interprete a period as a quarter. We use two independent AR(1) process
for log wages of women and men with a long-run wage gap of wF =wM = 0:8 but equal
persistence of 0.75. We then calibrate the remaining parameters to match the empirical
time-use ratios in Table 2. This gives  = 0:5899 to match the gender ratio of home
production time in steady state. The steady-state utility weights are calibrated to M
= 0:4239 and F = 0:5761 to generate the empirical gender ratio of total working times.
Finally, to generate the empirical ratios of home production to market work, we obtain
d = 0:8876 and gender-specic utility weights on labor, lM = 11:6263 and lF = 6:2954.
1The model presented can of course explain also these long-run di¤erences in time use between genders,
see Section 5. Women are predicted to work a higher fraction of their total work in the household if they
are more productive than men there and/or if they earn systematically lower wages in the market.
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Table 3: Estimation results for the model variant without home production using articial
data stemming from a simulation of the full model.
prior posterior
variable distrib. mean std. dev. mean 5% conf. 95% conf
M gamma 1.500 1.000 12.4137 12.4096 12.4163
F gamma 1.500 1.000 0.4198 0.4191 0.4202
From the simulation of the full model, we save time series of the cyclical components of
male and female wages and market hours ( bwM ; bwF , bnM , bnF ). Then, we use this articial
data to estimate the model variant without home production. Specically, we estimate
the labor disutility parameters M and F and the variances of the wage shocks taking the
other parameters as given above (as long as they exist in the model variant without home
production). We use a Bayesian estimation technique for dynamic stochastic equilibrium
models and use a prior gamma distribution with mean 1.5 and variance 1 for both, M
and F . The estimation results for M and F are given in Table 3. Although the data-
generating model features no gender di¤erences in preferences, the estimation results for
the model without home production strongly reject the null hypothesis of equal preferences
across genders. This indicates, that researchers may wrongly conclude that there are
substantial gender di¤erences in preferences when home production is omitted from the
estimated model.
Estimation with real world data. In order to obtain some insights how the simu-
lation results square with actual data, we also estimate the two above considered model
variants 1 and 3 with real world data. Unfortunately, there is no perfectly tting time-
series data available at buiness-cycle frequency. While the model uses the hourly wage
rate to predict hours worked, the BLS publishes gender-specic labor-market outcomes at
quarterly frequency only for labor earnings of the full-time employed and the employment-
to-population ratio. We use these data in seasonally adjusted and HP-ltered (1600) form
for the time period 1979Q1-2012Q4.
Especially the earnings time series has a strong implication for our estimation re-
sults. As the earnings series are relatively volatile, models can generate the relatively low
volatility of employment only with rather low Frisch elasticities. However, the estima-
tion results conrm our result that home production is important for the identication
of gender specic Frisch elasticities and work preferences. We estimate the preference
parameters M and F as well as the parameters of the gender-specic wage processes.
Again, we take the other parameters as given and use the values described above. The
results are given in Tables 4 and 5. In the model with home production, we estimate
rather similar preferences of women and men, see Table 4. By contrast, in the model
without home production, the results strongly reject gender equality in preferences, see
Table 5.
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Table 4: Estimation results for the model variant with home production and simultaneous
choice using real-world data.
prior posterior
variable distrib. mean std. dev. mean 5% conf. 95% conf
M gamma 1.500 1.000 15.1296 13.8172 16.0483
F gamma 1.500 1.000 14.8703 12.8093 16.5941
Table 5: Estimation results for the model variant without home production using real-
world data.
prior posterior
variable distrib. mean std. dev. mean 5% conf. 95% conf
M gamma 1.500 1.000 12.5689 12.5687 12.5695
F gamma 1.500 1.000 0.8817 0.8792 0.8844
4 Implications for long-run elasticities
In this section, we consider the implications of our results for the long-run elasticities of
labor supply. Empirical evidence suggests that also long-run elasticities di¤er substan-
tially between genders. Uncompensated (Marshallian) long-run elasticities are usually
estimated in a range of 0-0.3 for men while estimates for women lie around 0.6 (esti-
mates for both genders in the US are reported by Hausman and Ruud 1984, Triest 1990,
Devereux 2004, Eissa and Hoynes 2004, and Dechter 2013).
To determine the long-run elasticties in our model, we consider permanent wage
changes. We thus consider the model in a non-growing steady state where the rst-order
conditions (2) - (11) simplify to
Mc
 
M = ; (21)
F c
 
F = ; (22)
Mll
M
M = wM ; (23)
F ll
M
F = wF ; (24)
Mll
M
M =  (1  ) AhhFh M ; (25)
F ll
M
F =   Ahh 1F h1 M ; (26)
dd
 =; (27)
d=Ahh

Fh
1 
M ; (28)
cM + cF =wMnM + wFnF + T; (29)
1 =  (1 + r), and a function for the utility weights  which may react to long-run changes
due to imperfect commitment. T = rb+  captures all non-labor income.
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We consider the following linearized version of the steady-state conditions where x0
denotes the change of variable x between two steady states:
0M   c0M = 0; (30)
0F   c0F = 0; (31)
0M + M
nM
lM
n0M + M
hM
lM
h0M   0=w0M ; (32)
0F + F
nF
lF
n0F + F
hF
lF
h0F   0=w0F ; (33)
0M + M
nM
lM
n0M + M
hM
lM
h0M =A
0 + h0F   h0M + 0; (34)
0F + F
nF
lF
n0F + F
hF
lF
h0F =A
0   (1  )h0F + (1  )h0M + 0; (35)
 d0=0; (36)
d=A0 + h0F + (1  )h0M ; (37)
cM
c
c0M +
cF
c
c0F  
yM
Y
n0M  
yF
Y
n0F =
yM
Y
w0M +
yF
Y
w0F +
T
Y
T 0; (38)
0F +
M
F
0M =0; (39)
0F   0M = w0F   w0M : (40)
The last two conditions refer to the utility weights. Equation (39) mirrors that the sum
of the utility weights is constant. Equation (40) is the assumption that utility weights
react to long-run wage changes with an elasticity denoted by . Note that the system of
linearized steady-state conditions (30) - (40) contains changes in more exogenous variables
than the short-run system (12) - (17). Here, we also consider changes in non-labor income,
T 0, and changes in total factor productivity, A0. These are included for a balanced-growth
evaluation in the model with home production. Further, there are also more changes in
endogenous variables, as, in the long run, also the utility weights  and the marginal
valuation of wealth  may change and with them the consumption levels c of both spouses.
In the steady state, we distinguish between only two model variants, one without home
production (d = 0 ) and one with home production. Of course, the distinction between
predetermined home production and simultaneous choice is irrelevant in steady state.
4.1 Model variant without home production
In this model variant, it is imporant to notice that gains from marriage arise from insur-
ance over the business cycle. The model can also be written as the two spouses acting
subject to individual budget constraints with an endogenously determined transfer be-
tween them (e.g., Ligon 2002). However, it is an important result in these models that the
steady-state transfer reects di¤erences in wage uncertainty (thus, the insurance value of
marriage for each spouse) but not on the wage levels of the two spouses (which are not
equalized).
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Thus, spouses e¤ectively act subject to distinct budget constraints in the steady state.
For each of them, the problem simplies to
0B@ c
0
g
n0g
0
1CA=
0B@ g 0  10 g  1
1  Y TY 0
1CA
 10B@ 0 01 0
Y T
Y
T
Y
1CA w0g
T 0g
!
=
0BBBB@
(1+g)(T Y )
Y (g+g) Tg
gT
Y (g+g) Tg
(g 1)Y gT
Y (g+g) Tg
  gT
Y (g+g) Tg
g(1+g)(Y T )
Y (g+g) Tg
  gT
Y (g+g) Tg
1CCCCA
 
w0g
T 0g
!
.
The Marshallian labor-supply elasticity in this model variant is
MLSEg =
(g   1)Y   gT
Y
 
g + g
  Tg T=0= g   1g + g
where the latter equality refers to the case where non-labor income in the steady state
is zero. The long-run cross-wage elasticity is zero. The results imply that also gender
di¤erences in long-run labor-supply elasticities can only be due to gender di¤erences in
preferences in this model variant without home production. Next to di¤erences in the
curvature of labor disutility (g), also the risk aversion parameter g plays a role for long-
run labor-supply elasticities. Some experimental evidence (Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman,
and Meijers 2009) suggest that women are more risk averse than men are which might
explain their higher long-run labor-supply elasticities. However, this model variant is
compatible with balanced growth only under M = F = 1. But, then, labor supply
is completely independent of wages in the long run such that both gendersMarshallian
elasticties are zero and thus independent of g.
4.2 Model with home production
We now turn to the full model with home production. We simplify the system (30) - (40)
and express it in matrix form as
BX 0 =MZ 0 () X 0 = B 1MZ 0 = SZ 0 (41)
with
X =

c0M c
0
F n
0
M n
0
F h
0
M h
0
F 
0
T
; Z0 =

w0M w
0
F T
0 A0
T
;
M =
0BBBB@
  1 0  F M nMwM
 0 1 F  M nFwF
0 0 0 1   1   0
0 0 0 0 0 T
1CCCCA
T
;
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and
B =
0BBBBBBBBB@
   0 0 0 0
 0 MnMlM 0
MhM
lM
0
0  0 FnFlF 0
F hF
lF
0 0 MnMlM 0
MhM
lM
+  +  (1  )   (1  ) 
0 0 0 FnFlF   (1  ) (1  )
F hF
lF
+ 1   + 
cM cF  wMnM  wFnF 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
.
4.2.1 Simplied model version
Before we turn to evaluation the complete model for realistic parameters, we study a
simplifying special case to understand basic mechanisms of the model in the long run.
Specically, we consider the special case where  =  = F = M = d = 1, T = 0 and
l = 2. We further assume here that initial wages are equal and normalize them to 1. We
nally assume that inital utility weigths are equal, M = F = 1=2. In this special case,
the steady state of the household problem is nM = , hM = 1 , nF = 1 , hF = 1 ,
and cM = cF = 1=2. See appendix for a derivation of these steady-state results. Applying
these reults in (41), we can write the model as
0BBBBBBBBB@
 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0  0 1   0
0 1 0 1   0 
0 0  0 1 + 1   0
0 0 0 1   0 1 + 
1=2 1=2     (1  ) 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBB@
c0M
c0F
n0M
n0F
h0M
h0F
1CCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBB@
   0
1 0 0
0 1 0
 12 12 0
1
2  12 0
 1   0
1CCCCCCCCCA
0B@w
0
M
w0F
A0
1CA
Multiplying the inverse of the matrix on the left-hand side from the left, we obtain the
solution 0BBBBBBBBB@
c0M
c0F
n0M
n0F
h0M
h0F
1CCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBB@
1
2 +
1
2
1
2   12 0
1
2   12 12 + 12 0
1
   12   12   1 + 12 + 12  0
  11  + 12 + 12 1  11    12   12 1  0
 12 12 0
1
2  12 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
0B@w
0
M
w0F
A0
1CA . (42)
Now, we consider the Marshallian labor-supply elasticities of both spouses which are
given by entries (3; 1) and (4; 2) of the matrix above. As their short-run counterparts, we
can also express the long-run labor-supply elasticities as functions of initial steady-state
time-use ratios. Using that hF =lF =  and hM=lM = 1  , we obtain
MLSEg =
lg
hg
  1
2
  1
2
   lg
hg
. (43)
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In general, there are two counteracting e¤ects of the inital share of working time
devoted to home production: First, there is a standard substitution e¤ect. A higher
wage induces substitution of leisure against consumption. This induces the agent to work
more after a wage rise. As in the short run (see Section 3), this e¤ect is the stronger,
the more the agent initially worked in home production. The intuition is the same as
in the short run. Furthermore, there is a re-negotiation e¤ect in the long run. A higher
wage potentially (i.e., if  > 0) leads to a higher weight of this spouse in the household
target function. This, ceteris paribus, induces the spouse to consume more leisure and
work less after a wage rise. We can see in equation (43) that also this second e¤ect is the
stronger, the more the agent initially worked in home production. It follows that stark re-
negotiation after changes in relative wages counteract the e¤ects of initial specialization
on the long-run labor-supply elasticities. However, as long as 0   < 2, the spouse
which specializes in home production has the higher Marshallian elasticity as we can
writeMLSEg =  1=2+(1  =2) lF =hF . The empirical evidence of Lise and Seitz (2011)
suggests that  is about one. We can thus be relatively condent that the rst e¤ect
dominates and that long-run labor-supply elasticities are increasing in the initial time
share devoted to home production.
Home production also implies non-zero cross-wage elasticities of labor supply in the
long run. In this simplied model variant, the cross-wage elasticities are equal to the own-
wage elasticities with opposite sign. Both e¤ects discussed above occur symmetrically also
in the cross-wage elasticities. The importance of the re-negotiation e¤ect for the cross-
wage elasticities is discussed by Knowles (2013). We contribute here that the strength of
this e¤ect depends on the initial degree of specialization within married couples.
Finally note that this model variant is compatible with balanced growth. We can
easily see this, by setting

w0M w
0
F A
0
T
in (42) to

1 1 1
T
and performing the matrix
multiplication to obtain

c0M c
0
F n
0
M n
0
F h
0
M h
0
F
T
=

1 1 0 0 0 0
T
, i.e. no changes in
time use. A model with home production can thus be compatible with balanced growth
and still have substantial non-zero long-run labor-supply elasticities. This property dif-
ferentiates models with home production (e.g., also the one used in Jones, Manuelli, and
McGrattan 2003) from models without home production (see Section 4.1) even when the
latter can have substantial richness in the short-run labor-supply elasticities (like, e.g.,
the model of Ortigueira and Siassi 2013).
4.2.2 General model
Do the insights obtained in the model version above rely on the simplifying parameter
restrictions imposed? To answer this question, we now turn to describe long-run labor-
supply elasticities in the general model as described by (30) - (40). As we consider long-
run wage changes, we restrict ourselves to parameter constellations that ensure balanced
growth. In the appendix, we show that the model fullls balanced growth if and only if
 =  = 1.
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Under this condition, we can write the Marshallian elasticity of spouse g as
MLSEg = (
g + g) = g (44)
where
 g =   ng;
 =  gg + l gw gg + lgwg g + h gw g gg + hgwg gg;

g =
 
c g + h gw g + hgwg + l gw g   lgwg
  
lg + hgg

;
g = g

h g
l g
 g  
hg
lg
g

lgl gw g + clg g

   clg g + l glgw g + h glgw g g
(see appendix for a derivation). We see that the e¤ects discussed in the simplied model
version above also operate here although they are less easily visible. For a given total
workload lg, we can state the following relations between home production hg and the
components of the Marshallian elasticity. First, 
g increases in home-production share
which tends to generate a positive relation between the home-production share and the
Marshallian elasticity. Second,  g decreases in the home-production share which tends
to generate a positive relation between the home-production share and the Marshallian
elasticity (note that  is independent of gender). Third, g - which captures the re-
negotiation e¤ect - likely decreases in the home-production share which tends to generate
a negative relation between the home-production share and the Marshallian elasticity
(note that hg=lg further is a decreasing function of wg and an increasing function of w g).
So, as in the simplied model version, the re-negotiation e¤ect counteracts the e¤ect of
home production on the Marshallian elasticities. But also here, small values of  ensure
that this e¤ect is dominated.
To strengthen our understanding of the substitution and re-negotiation e¤ects on the
long-run labor-supply elasticities, Table 6 shows the Marshallian labor-supply elasticities
of both spouses for di¤erent values for the labor disutility parameters g and the strength
of the re-negotiation . The remaining parameters of the model have been calibrated to
match the time-use ratios in Table 2 with a gender wage gap of wF =wM = 0:8 for any
triplet (M ; F ; ).
The rst block in Table 6 shows results for a relatively high number of g = 10 for
both spouses implying an Frisch labor-supply elasticity of 0.1 in a model without home
production. We can see that our model with home production implies long-run labor-
supply elasticities of 0.25 to 0.9 with these preferences (as a comparison, remember that
the Marshallian elasticities are zero in a model without home production under balanced
growth). Two results catch the eye in the rst block of the table. First, long-run labor-
supply elasticities are considerable higher for women. The gender di¤erence amounts to
about factor 2.5 to 3 which arises - since preferences are equal - from initial specialization
within the household (which in turn results from the gender wage gap and the productivity
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Table 6: Long-run labor-supply elasticities for di¤erent labor-disutility parameters and
strengths of re-negotiation.
M F  MLSEM MLSEF
1 10 10 0 0.3523 0.8987
2 10 10 0.5 0.3070 0.8527
3 10 10 1 0.2616 0.8067
4 1.5 1.5 0 0.7806 1.6166
5 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.5274 1.2536
6 1.5 1.5 1 0.2742 0.8907
7 1.5 0.5 0 0.9400 2.5886
8 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.6067 1.8556
9 1.5 0.5 1 0.2734 1.1225
Notes: other parameters calibrated to match the time-use ratios in Table 2 for a gender wage gap of
wF =wM = 0:8. This implies  = 0:59 independent of g and . Further, M = 0:31 for M = 10 and
M = 0:42 for M = 1:5.
di¤erence in home production). Second, both genders Marshallian elasticities decrease
in the degree of re-negotiation after long-run wage changes. This e¤ect is of about equal
size for both genders.
In the second block of the table, we consider a substantially lower value for g, implying
higher Frisch elasticities. We observe that this leads to higher labor-supply elasticities
also in the long run eventhough the e¤ect of lowering g is very small when  = 1. In
this block, we also observe substantially higher Marshallian elasticities for women than
for men and a reduction in Marshallian elasticities as  increases.
Finally, we consider gender di¤erences in preferences in the third block of the table
where we set the curvature of labor disutility to 0.5 for women. This would induce gender
di¤erences in the Frisch elasticity also in a model without home production. This variation
in F increases the womens Marshallian elasticity - and (except for  = 1) also slightly
mens. However, without re-negotitation ( = 0) the introduction of gender di¤erences
in preferences has only a very small e¤ect on the gender di¤erence in the Marshallian
elasticity. Comparing lines 4 and 7 of Table 6, the ratio MLSEF =MLSEM increases
from 2.07 to only 2.75. In other words, only one fourth of the gender di¤erence in the
Marshallian elasticity is caused by gender di¤erences in preferences. The importance of
preference di¤erences in even somewhat lower when re-negotiations are strong.
5 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that gender di¤erences in the elasticity of labor supply can
be explained as a result of household specialization. While empirical gender di¤erences
in Frisch elasticities are estimated to be about factor 2, empirical time-use ratios alone
imply di¤erences of somewhat below factor 1.5. The importance of home production
for labor-supply elasticities can bring about biased estimates in models without home
productions. We have further demonstrated that long-run elasticities are also a¤ected
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by household specialization and that models with home production can have substantial
non-zero long-run elasticities and still be compatible with balanced growth. Under limited
commitment, re-negotiation e¤ects of long-run wage changes can also a¤ect labor-supply
elasticties. The policy implications of our results include potentially larger e¤ects of
employment subsidies for groups that initially specialize in home production but also a
non-constancy of labor-supply elasticities that policy makers should take into account.
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Appendix
Simplied Model version: initial steady state
We use  =  = d = M = F = wM = wF = 1, M = F = 1=2, and T = 0 in the
model (21)-(29). We then use conditions (27) and (28) in conditions (25) and (26) to
write the system as
cM = (2)
 1 ;
cF = (2)
 1 ;
llM =2;
llF =2;
llM =2 (1  )h 1M
llF =2h
 1
F
cM + cF = nM + nF :
We now use the rst and second condition in the nal condition and combine the third
and fourth condition which imply lM = lF = l to obtain
ll=2,  1 = 2l 1 1l ;
ll=2 (1  )h 1M ;
ll=2h
 1
F ;
(2) 1 + (2) 1=  1 = nM + nF :
We now use the rst condition in the fourth and re-arrange all equations to obtain.
ll=2 (1  )h 1M , ll (l   nM ) = ll2   lnM l = 2 (1  ) ;
ll=2h
 1
F , ll (l   nF ) = ll2   lnF l = 2;
2l 1 1l = nM + nF , 2 = lnM l + lnF l:
Using the rst two conditions in the last condition gives
2 = ll
2   2 (1  ) + ll2   2 = 2ll2   2
, l =
p
2=l:
Now using l = 2, we can derive the solution as
l=1;
ll=2 (1  )h 1M , 2 = 2 (1  )h 1M , hM = 1  ; nM = ;
ll=2h
 1
F , hF = ; hF = 1  ;
cM = cF = (2)
 1 = (llM ) 1 = 1=2.
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General model: balanced growth and Marshallian elasticities
Calculating S = B 1M with B and M dened as in (41), we can determine the Marshal-
lian labor-supply elasticity, the cross-wage elasticity, the elasticity to home productivity,
and the elasticity to non-labor income for the husband and the wife as S3;1, S3;2, S3;3,
and S3;4 and S4;2, S4;1, S4;3, and S4;4 respectively. Balanced-growth requires that
Sj;1 + Sj;2 + Sj;3 + Sj;4 = 0 for j = 3; 4 (45)
Dene j (g) with j (M) = 3 and j = (F ) = 4 and g with F =  and M = 1   .
Functionally, the elasticities read as
MLSEg =Sj(g);j(g) 2 = (
g + g) = g
MLSEcrossg =Sj(g);j( g) 2 =
 

crossg + 
cross
g

= g
LSEAg =Sj(g);3 = (1  )  g= g
LSETg =Sj(g);4 = T
  lg g   hg gg = g
where
 g = c gng gg + cgng gg + l gngw gg + lgngwg g
+h gngw g gg + hgngwg gg;

g = ngwg
  lg g   hg gg+ c glg g + cglg g + l glgw g
+c ghg gg + cghg gg + l ghgw gg    gc ghg gg    gcghg gg
+ gh glgw g g + h glgw g g    gl ghgw gg +  gc ghg gg
+ gcghg gg    gh glgw g g +  gl ghgw gg + h ghgw g gg;
g = g
 
h glgw g g   cghg gg   c ghg gg   l ghgw gg

   c glg g + l glgw g   cghg gg + h glgw g g ;

crossg = n gw g
  lg g   hg gg  l glgw g   l ghgw gg
+ gc ghg gg +  gcghg gg    gh glgw g g   h glgw g g
+ gl ghgw gg    gc ghg gg    gcghg gg
+ gh glgw g g    gl ghgw gg   h ghgw g gg;
crossg =
 
c glg g + l glgw g   cghg gg + h glgw g g

 g
 
h glgw g g   cghg gg   c ghg gg   l ghgw gg

;
g = h glgw g g   cghg gg   c ghg gg   l ghgw gg:
Thus, the balanced-growth condition (45) can be written as

g + g +

cross
g + 
cross
g + (1  ) g + T
  lg g   hg gg = 0 (46)
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As g =  crossg , see above, we can thus simplify the balanced-growth condition (46) to

g +

cross
g + (1  ) g + T
  lg g   hg gg = 0.
Using the functional forms of 
g and 
crossg , we obtain

g +

cross
g + (1  ) g + T
  lg g   hg gg
= ngwg
  lg g   hg gg+ c glg g + cglg g + l glgw g + c ghg gg
+cghg gg + l ghgw gg    gc ghg gg    gcghg gg +  gh glgw g g
+h glgw g g    gl ghgw gg +  gc ghg gg +  gcghg gg
  gh glgw g g +  gl ghgw gg + h ghgw g gg
+n gw g
  lg g   hg gg  l glgw g   l ghgw gg +  gc ghg gg
+ gcghg gg    gh glgw g g   h glgw g g +  gl ghgw gg
  gc ghg gg    gcghg gg +  gh glgw g g    gl ghgw gg
 h ghgw g gg + (1  ) g + T
  lg g   hg gg
= (ngwg + n gw g)
  lg g   hg gg+ (1  ) g + T   lg g   hg gg
+c glg g + cglg g + c ghg gg + cghg gg
= clg g + chg gg   n glgw g g   lgngwg g   n ghgw g gg
 hgngwg gg + (1  ) g + T
  lg g   hg gg
=  (wgng + w gn g) (hg + ng)  g + (wgng + w gn g)hg gg   n g (hg + ng)w g g
  (hg + ng)ngwg g   n ghgw g gg   hgngwg gg
+(1  ) g + T
 
(hg + ng)  g + hg gg   lg g   hg gg

,
where we used cg + c g = c = wgng + w gn g + T and lg = ng + hg. For this to be zero
independent of T we need
lg g + hg gg   lg g   hg gg = (1  ) lg g + (1  )hg gg = 0
Which is, for general lg; hg;  g; g , only fullled if  =  = 1. Is this necessary condition
also su¢ cient? We set  =  = 1 and obtain

g +

cross
g + (1  ) g + T
  lg g   hg gg
= (wgng + w gn g) (hg + ng)  g + (wgng + w gn g)hg gg   n g (hg + ng)w g g
  (hg + ng)ngwg g   n ghgw g gg   hgngwg gg = 0:
This implies that
 =  = 1
is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for balanced growth. Under this condition,  g, 
g,
and g simplify to the terms expressed in Section 4.2.2 of the main text.
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